
























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study 
of Labor 
Do as the Neighbors Do: The Impact of 
Social Networks on Immigrant Employment





Do as the Neighbors Do: 
The Impact of Social Networks 




Risk Analysis Division, OCC 
 
Simon Burgess 
















P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 







Do as the Neighbors Do: 
The Impact of Social Networks on Immigrant Employment
* 
 
Substantial immigrant segregation in the United States, combined with the increase in the 
share of the U.S. foreign-born population, have led to great interest in the causes and 
consequences of immigrant concentration, including those related to the functioning of labor 
markets. This paper provides robust evidence that both the size and the quality of an 
immigrant enclave affects the labor market outcomes of new immigrants. We develop new 
measures of the quality, or information value, of immigrant networks by exploiting data based 
on worker earnings records matched to firm and Census information. We demonstrate the 
importance of immigrant employment links: network members are much more likely than 
other immigrants to be employed in the same firm as their geographic neighbors. Immigrants 
living with large numbers of employed neighbors are more likely to have jobs than immigrants 
in areas with fewer employed neighbors. The effects are quantitatively important and robust 
under alternative specifications. For example, in a high value network – one with an average 
employment rate in the 90th percentile – a one standard deviation increase in the log of the 
number of contacts in the network is associated with almost a 5% increase in the 
employment rate. Earnings, conditional on employment, increase by about 0.7%. 
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namely  both  the  number  of  contacts  and  the  quality  of  those  contacts.  The  results  are 
consistent  with  the  view  that  new  immigrants’  success  or  failure  in  the  labor  market  is 
influenced by the characteristics of the social networks in their local neighborhood. Immigrants 
living with large numbers of employed neighbors are more likely to have jobs than immigrants in 











together  in  the  same  form,  relative  to  others  in  the  same  neighborhood.  We  find  strong 
evidence supporting this idea: immigrants who are members of ethnic enclaves are much more 
likely to be employed with neighbors than other immigrants. This gives some credence to the 









could  influence  employment  outcomes:  the  more  employed  contacts  an  individual  has,  the 
more  likely  it  is  that  the  individual  will  learn  about  new  job  openings.  This  framework  is 
important because it suggests that both the quantity (the number of contacts) and the quality 
(the employment status of those contacts) of networks are important in terms of getting jobs.   4







for  low‐wage  workers  (Ioannides  and  Datcher‐Loury  2004).  The  social  network  evidence 
suggests  that  the  use  of  informal  contacts  varies  by  age,  race,  and  ethnicity  as  well  as  by 
location: those in high poverty neighborhoods and in large cities are substantially more likely to 
use informal networks.  Finally, job search aided by personal ties is particularly productive for 
less  well‐educated  workers  in  high  poverty  neighborhoods  (Elliott  1999),  a  finding  we  echo 
below. 















number  of  authors  have  noted  the  likelihood  of  slower  rates  of  cultural  and  economic 


















i i i i Network X Y ε α β + + =         (1) 
where  i  indexes  individuals,  X  is  a  set  of  standard  controls  for  productivity  related 
characteristics, Network measures the information value of the social network for individual i, 
and ε is an error term.    
The  empirical  identification  of  α,  the  primary  parameter  of  interest,  in  equation  (1)  is 
complicated for a number of reasons.  One is the lack of direct measures on actual contacts.  
There is also a set of problems associated with omitted variables.  One is geographic in nature: 
geographic  differences  in  labor  demand  will  affect  individual  outcomes  for  all  in  a  given 
neighborhood,  independent  of  any  network  effects.  Another  is  social:  discrimination  will 







Much  of  the  previous  literature  assumes  networks  are  geographically  based  and  estimates   7
versions of:  
















Another  strand  of  the  literature  emphasizes  ethnicity  in  defining  networks.  New 












immigrants  from  the  same  country,  but  there  are  also  arguably  strong  incentives  for  new 









particular, we replace  i network  in equation (1) with  ) (i jk jkY C , where j indexes Census tracts, k 
country of birth, and  jk C  is the log of the pool of available contacts defined by individuals in the 
same Census track and of same origin. Finally, because we are interested in the impact of social 
networks on labor market outcomes, and the potential contacts with employers, we weight the 
number of contacts by whether or not they have jobs, namely,  ) (i jk Y  which is the employment 
rate of that group.  This yields an empirical specification of 














the  network  measure  particularly  with  the  number  of  available  contacts,  Cjk.  Lazear,  in 
particular, has argued that the larger the size of the ethnic group, the less necessary it is for 












One potential source of selection bias still remains. Including  jk C  only controls for self‐
selection to the extent that correlation between the network variable and  jk C  is fixed across 
immigrant groups. If that is not the case, self‐selection that is differential across immigrant 
groups  could  still  contaminate  the  results.  We  follow  the  technique  used  by  Bertrand  et  al 
(2000)  to  address  this  type  of  selection  bias  by  instrumenting  jk C   with  the  number  of 
individuals from country k who reside in the metropolitan area. It is chosen as an instrument 
based on the idea that it is correlated with the scope for co‐location of members from the same 











Census  Bureau  (Abowd,  Haltiwanger,  and  Lane  2004).  This  database  consists  of  quarterly 
records  of  the  employment  and  earnings  of  almost  all  individuals  from  the  unemployment 
insurance (UI) systems of a number of US states in the 1990s – these provide the key link 















(StARS),  which  incorporates  data  from  the  Internal  Revenue  Service  (IRS)  1040  and  1099, 
Housing  and  Urban  Development  (HUD),  Medicare,  Indian  Health  Service,  Selective  Service 





































































Finally  Table  2a  provides  basic  information  on  labor  market  outcomes  for  recent 

















Mexicans  that  exceeds  40%  would  be  classified  as  Mexican  enclaves.  The  first  difference 






value,  the  enclave  effects  are  such  that  the  employment  rate  is  0.39%  higher  and  average 
earnings  almost  $10,000.  In  particular,  the  earnings  results  suggest  that  recent  Mexican 
immigrants residing in an enclave have slightly lower earnings than those that do not. Thus, the 





different  for  other  immigrants  groups’  respective  enclaves  (see  Cutler,  Glaeser,  and  Vigdor 
2008). Indeed, when we estimate the impact of Chinese enclaves (not reported; available from 
the  authors)  we  find  fairly  large  negative  earnings  effect  associated  with  enclaves.  More 






































the  log  of  the  size  of  the  immigrant  group  in  the  MSA  is  0.46  and  highly  significant  when 







under  the  null‐hypothesis  that  selection  accounts  for  the  results.  If  endogenous  location 
decisions account for the results, the true network effect would be zero,  0 = TRUE α . As a result, 
the  bias  in  our  estimated  results  could  be  derived  by  comparing  the  coefficient  from  the 












































IV R is  the  R‐square  from  the  first  stage  in  the  IV‐estimation.  Because  it  is 
presumably easier to move within than across MSAs, we would expect the ratio to exceed 1 if 
the  hypothesis  that  0 = TRUE α   is  correct.  However,  the  ratio  is  0.796  for  the  employment 
equation and 0.810 for the earnings equation. This implies that it is unlikely that the results 
could be driven completely by endogenous location decisions.  











































the  very  large  Los  Angeles  MSA.  It  has  also  been  argued  that  network  effects  are  more 
important  for  women  than  for  men,  so  we  also  estimate  the  same  specification  excluding 
women.  Finally,  since  another  strand  of  the  literature  suggests  that  networks  are  more 





























































through  which  network  membership  improves  employment  outcomes  is  a  very  direct  one. 
Enclave members are disproportionately more likely to work with other enclave members than 
are  other  neighbors,  suggesting  a  fairly  direct  role  for  the  network  as  a  labor  market 
intermediary.  
These results contribute to a number of related literatures. First, the results provide 
new  evidence  on  the  role  of  ethnic  enclaves,  showing  that  they  can  have  a  positive  role 
improving employment and earnings for new immigrants who are enclave members. Of course, 
further  research  is  warranted.  Our  analysis  quantifies  the  way  in  which  enclaves  provide 
immigrants with pathways into jobs and higher earnings, at least in the relatively near term.  




2007;  Ioannides  and  Datcher‐Loury,  2004)).  We  have  shown  that  network  membership  is 
productive  for  new  immigrants.  Thinking  of  these  immigrant  networks  as  labor  market 
intermediaries  opens  lines  of  enquiry  about  the  network  itself,  how  it  evolves  over  time, 
whether there are different ‘business models’ for networks. For example, some networks may 









Abowd, John, John Haltiwanger, and Julia Lane. 2004. Integrated Longitudinal 
Employee-Employer Data for the United States. American Economic Review 
94:224-229. 
Abowd, John, Bryce Stephens, and Lars Vilhuber. 2008. The LEHD Infrastructure Files 
and the Creation of the Quarterly Workforce Indicators. In Producer Dynamics: 
New Evidence from Micro Data, edited by T. Dunne, J. B. Jensen and M. Roberts: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Bauer, Thomas, Gil Epstein, and Ira Gang. 2002. Enclaves, Language and the Location 
Choice of Migrants. In IZA Discussion Paper 2002. Bonn, Germany. 
Bayer, Patrick, Stephen L. Ross, and Giorgio Topa. 2008. Place of Work and Place of 
Residence: Informal Hiring Networks and Labor Market Outcomes. Journal of 
Political Economy 116 (6):1150-1196. 
Bertrand, Marianne, Erzo F. P. Luttmer, and Sendhil Mullainathan. 2000. Network 
Effects and Welfare Cultures. Quarterly Journal of Economics 115 (3):1019-
1055. 
Borjas, George. 2006. Making it in America: Social Mobility in the Immigrant 
Population. In NBER Working Paper 12088. 
Borjas, George J. 1995. Ethnicity, Neighborhoods, and Human-Capital Externalities. 
American Economic Review 85 (3):365-90. 
Calvo-Armengol, Antoni, and Matthew O. Jackson. 2004. The Effects of Social 
Networks on Employment and Inequality. American Economic Review 94 
(3):426-454. 
Chiswick, Barry. 2002. Do Enclaves Matter in Immigrant Adjustment?*. 
Chiswick, Barry, and Paul Miller. 1995. The Endogeneity between Language and 
Earnings: International Analyses. Journal of Labor Economics 13 (2):246-288. 
Cutler, David, and Edward Glaeser. 1997. Are Ghettos Good or Bad? Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 112:827-872. 
Cutler, David M., Edward L. Glaeser, and Jacob L. Vigdor. 2008. When are ghettos bad? 
Lessons from immigrant segregation in the United States. Journal of Urban 
Economics 63 (3):759-774. 
Damm, Anna Pil. 2006. Ethnic Enclaves and Immigrant Labour Market Outcomes: Quasi 
Experimental Evidence. In University of Aarhus Department of Economics 
Working Paper. Aarhus, Denmark. 
Edin, Per-Anders, Peter Fredriksson, and Olaf Aslund. 2004. Ethnic Enclaves and the 
Economic Success of Immigrants—Evidence From a Natural Experiment. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (1):329-357. 
Elliott, John. 1999. Social Isolation and Labor Market Isolation: Network and 
Neighborhood Effects on Less Educated Urban Workers,". Sociological 
Quarterly. 40 (2):199-216. 
Freedman, Matthew, Julia Lane, and Marc Roemer. 2008. New Approaches to Creating 
Data for Economic Geographers. Journal of Official Statistics 24 (1):133-156.   26
Granovetter, Mark. 1995. Getting a job: A study of contacts and careers. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Haltiwanger, John, Julia Lane, and James Spletzer. 2007. Wage, Productivity and the 
Dynamic Interaction of Businesses and Workers. Labour Economics 14 (3):575-
602. 
Ioannides, Yannis, and Linda Datcher-Loury. 2004. Job Information Networks, 
Neighborhood Effects, and Inequality,. Journal of Economic Literature 42:1056-
1093. 
Jackson, Matthew O. 2007. The Study of Social Network in Economics. In Missing 
Links: Formation and Decay of Economic Networks edited by J. E. Rauch. New 
York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Lazear, Edward  P. 1999. Culture and Language. Journal of Political Economy 107 
(s6):S95-S126. 
Passel, Jeffrey, and Roberto Suro. 2005. Pew Hispanic Center. 
Patel, Krishna, and Francis Vella. 2007. Immigrant Networks and Their Implications for 
Occupational Choice and Wages. In IZA Discussion Papers. Bonn, Germany. 
Rees, Albert. 1966. Information Networks in Labor Markets. American Economic Review 
56 (2):559-66. 










































































Sample  Fraction  of  Neighbors  in 
Census  Tract  that  are 
immigrants (std. dev) 
Actual  fraction  of  neighbors 
in Census Tract that are from 























from Mexico?  Yes No Difference
Employment in 1999 
Yes  80.99% 80.00% 0.99%
No  79.45% 78.85% 0.60%
Difference  1.54% 1.15% 0.39%
Average Earnings in 1999 (employed) 
Yes  $13,127 $14,555 ($1,428)
No  $13,177 $24,262 ($11,085)
Difference  ($50) ($9,707) $9,657
25th Percentile Earnings in 1999 (employed) 
Yes  $5,824 $6,038 ($214)
No  $5,769 $6,313 ($544)
Difference  $55 ($275) $330
Median Earnings in 1999 (employed) 
Yes  $11,853 $12,114 ($261)
No  $11,540 $13,201 ($1,661)
Difference  $313 ($1,087) $1,400
75th Percentile Earnings in 1999 (employed) 
Yes  $18,125 $19,110 ($985)
No  $17,522 $25,810 ($8,288)







   Yes  No  Yes  No 
Gender   
Female  56.03%  53.26%  47.53%  46.08% 
Male  43.97%  46.74%  52.47%  53.92% 
Age         
25‐34  65.96%  68.31%  53.15%  52.67% 
35‐54  29.90%  28.37%  41.58%  42.49% 
55‐64  4.15%  3.33%  5.27%  4.84% 
Education         
Less than high  71.84%  64.05%  44.84%  19.95% 
High school  17.06%  18.15%  21.78%  18.06% 
Some college (no  6.65%  9.18%  11.03%  12.86% 
College degree  4.44%  8.63%  22.34%  49.13% 
MSA         
Austin  1.28%  1.27%  2.38%  2.03% 
Chicago  27.66%  10.83%  39.29%  19.15% 
Dallas  7.94%  5.60%  10.61%  7.09% 
Daytona Beach  0.00%  0.03%  0.00%  0.25% 
Fort Lauderdale  0.01%  0.50%  0.24%  6.39% 
Houston  11.03%  11.53%  12.69%  10.15% 
Los Angeles  30.66%  46.07%  18.84%  25.56% 
Miami  0.21%  0.86%  1.59%  18.55% 
Orange County  14.10%  8.93%  11.82%  6.05% 
Pittsburg  0.00%  0.11%  0.00%  1.72% 
Riverside  4.00%  11.89%  1.54%  2.31% 





Estimation Method:  OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
ln(POPk,j)*(EMPk,j‐EMP)  0.064** 0.054**  0.135**  0.113** 
   (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.029)  (0.023) 
0.002  ‐0.012  ‐0.010  ‐0.045*  ln(POPk,j) 
(0.003)  (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.017) 
Age  0.017** 0.017**  0.065**  0.064** 
   (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
age*age/100  ‐ ‐0.024**  ‐ ‐0.090** 
   (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Male  0.264** 0.263**  0.746**  0.746** 
   (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
High‐School Diploma  0.017  0.016  0.072**  0.072** 
   ‐0.010  ‐0.010  (0.026)  (0.026) 
Some College  0.007  0.006  0.080*  0.081* 
   ‐0.013  ‐0.013  (0.033)  (0.033) 
College Degree  0.047** 0.046**  0.418**  0.419** 
   (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.029)  (0.029) 
Country of Birth Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Tract Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  18,409  18,409  15,050  15,050 
R‐squared  0.10  0.10  0.19  0.19 
Response to Shock|EMPk,j=P10  ‐5.09% ‐4.29% ‐0.73%  ‐0.61%






Estimation Method:  OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
ln(POPk,j)*(EMPk,j‐EMP)  0.044**  0.038**  0.139**  0.098** 







































































































Demographic controls  No  No  Yes 
Observations  136,220  136,220  15,031 









































Demographic controls  No  No  Yes 
Observations  8,827  8,827  8,827 





































Demographic controls  No  No  Yes 
Observations  61,607  61,607  6,959 
R‐squared  0.01  0.28  0.28 
 